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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European telecommunications industry’s restructuring is mainly due to the convergence among 
the telecommunications, the media, and the computer industries. Currently, the growth in specific 
market segments of the INFOCOM (the information and communications industry) has affected each 
existing industry structure. New dynamics and relationships among actors have modified respective 
value chains. At the same time, three underlying industrial structural forces namely, regulation, 
technology, and market dynamics, have altered the European telecommunications industry. The 
industry’s deregulation was aimed at designing efficient markets through the introduction of 
competition among firms (Flacher & Jennequin, 2005), as well as implementing new incentives to 
entrants and the break-up of the incumbents’ monopolies through progressive markets liberalization 
over time (i.e., markets for terminal equipment, value added services, mobile telephony, voice 
telephony and public network provision).  
This paper investigates the early vertical re-integration process among specific layers since the 
European telecommunications deregulation. We attribute the early vertical re-integration in the 
European telecommunications industry as being the result of the co-evolution of technologies, 
regulation, and market dynamics. We emphasize on the effects of these changes occurring at the 
downstream and the upstream, between and within segmented layers of the industry value chain as the 
outcome of the evolving interactions among actors from different market segments, based more on 
long-term collaborative arrangements and history dependency. This paper aims at understanding the 
restructuring process during the ‘organization of the industry’ (Richardson, 1972) and to assess the 
factors influencing the redesign of the industry boundaries from actors in a highly regulated 
environment. Our paper present three main studies and focuses on the mechanisms and firms’ actions 
in shaping the evolution of an industry structure (Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005; 
Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005).  
The paper is structured as follows. The first part reviews the literature about firms’ strategies in 
redrawing industry boundaries in a dynamic environment. The second part introduces the context and 
the key players in the European telecommunications industry. We distinguish two phases during the 
industry transition, a phase one from vertical integration to disintegration (influence of regulation) and 
a phase two from disintegration to re-integration (influences of market forces and co-evolution of 
technologies). The third part focuses on the second phase and the mobile-fixed interface. Specifically, 
our analysis will be about how firms strategize vis-à-vis one another in shaping new market 
characteristics.  
2. FIRMS’ STRATEGIES IN REDRAWING INDUSTRY 
BOUNDARIES IN A DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT 
In strategic management literature, the purpose of delineating the industry boundaries is to assess the 
nature of competition, to position different firms, to analyze the industry profitability and its 
attractiveness (Porter, 1980), to understand sectors dynamics and to monitor the macroeconomic 
environment such as the Political, Economic, Social and Technological factors (PEST framework). 
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Therefore, the delineation of the industry boundaries serves to determine firms’ strategies. In this 
perspective, industries are classified based on a selected unit of analysis such as groups of firms, 
sectors of activities, actors, products classification, high versus low tech industries, technological 
systems, factor intensities or industrial performances (Peneder, 2003).  
However, this traditional industry perspective with such a well defined market structure seems 
insufficient, if not inappropriate, in markets being restructured or about to be created, as the result of 
the co-evolution of technologies and market dynamics, within an industry in transformation (Sampler, 
1998; Munir & Philips, 2002). A converging market (Jacobides & Winter, 2005) is a concrete 
illustration. In this case, the industry boundaries render difficult to identify the relevant actors, and 
adequately categorize product offerings (Munir & Philips, 2002). Thus, the study of an industry 
boundaries remains still incomplete because of a lack of understanding about the factors leading to the 
vertical integration, disintegration and more particularly the emergence of the vertical re-integration 
process at the industry level (Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005; Cacciatori & 
Jacobides, 2005). This omission leads towards a misconception of competition between inter and intra 
sectors, the effects of groups firms’ strategies during the early stage of market restructuring and the 
shift in the value of resources over time among actors within an integrated technological system 
(Adner & Zemsky, 2002). Indeed, the evolutionary mechanisms of an industry, at the aggregate level, 
is an important aspect of the overall sectors dynamics among markets (Jacobides & Winter, 2005), and 
at the micro level, why incumbent firms succeed or failed in coping with the effects of technological 
change. 
In the literature, the Transactions Cost Economics research (TCE) has focused on determining the 
firm’s boundaries (Williamson, 1985), by looking at the coordination mechanisms, the types of 
transactions costs and the various effects between the market and the individual firm. Thus, TCE 
distinguishes the tasks performed within the firm from the ones in the market, which factors affect the 
individual firm’s choice and the type of governance structures. From this perspective, the firm‘s 
boundaries are assessed either by looking at the firm’s vertical boundaries (buy or make) or at the 
firm’s horizontal boundaries (i.e., the size and the scope influencing a market structure, the market 
power of different actors, the degree of entry barriers and the cost per unit of a product). Generally, the 
firm’s horizontal boundaries (i.e., the scale and the scope of activities are used as the firm’s 
boundaries) have been explained as a firms’ specialization in a stable (Bruisoni et al., 2001) and 
unstable environment (Afuah, 2001). However, few studies address the effects of firms ‘strategies in 
redrawing industry boundaries in a dynamic environment (Adner & Zemsky, 2002, Gatignon & 
Soberman, 2001). 
This paper departs from transaction cost theory (the focus is about contractual versus non contractual) 
and agency theory (the focus is about the ownership of assets). These streams of research do not assess 
the positive effects of innovation practices in the firm’s performance in a highly regulated industry 
(Kraftt, 2003). Long-term collaborative arrangements are not always assessed in the incumbent firm’s 
product offerings (Gulati et al, 2005). Therefore, further explanations are needed in assessing issues 
such as the co-evolution of firm’s capabilities over time (Jacobides & Winter, 2005), the strategic 
partners’ resources during the incumbent firm’s production process (Gulati et al., 2005; Gomes-
Casseres, 2005; Kraftt, 2003) and the collaboration / competition among firms known as ‘co-opetition’ 
(Nalebluff & Brandenburger, 1995). This is mainly because the effects of firm’s vertical integration 
and its impact on the industry structure are an under-researched area in industry analysis literature 
(Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005). 
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Our approach in this paper stems from a better understanding of firms’ strategies in redrawing industry 
boundaries through the effects of collaborative arrangements between firms across the various 
‘industry layers’. The specificity of the telecommunications sector (Kraftt, 2003; Fransman, 2002; Li 
& Whalley, 2002) is characterized by the existence of complementary assets (Teece, 1986), the 
interoperability among telecommunications infrastructure networks, the use of common standards and 
network effects. Few studies looked at the effects of vertical disintegration of a sector and its impact at 
the industry structure (Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005), the reasons why certain industries re-integrate 
(Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005) or disintegrate through the firm’s capabilities over time (Jacobides & 
Winter, 2005). In this line of studies, we believe that the question of how firms strategize, as a result 
of the shrinking, enlargement or convergence of current industry boundaries in times of change may 
deepen further our knowledge about the constant interactions between the firm’s micro and macro 
environment. Specifically, the dynamics process and the causes occurring during different phases: 
vertical integration, disintegration and re-integration and the changing relationships at intra and inter 
sectors competition / collaboration within an industry. 
The first part of this paper is structured as follow: first, we will introduce the context; secondly, we 
will introduce the shift of market boundaries and the effects of technological change on firm’s 
capabilities. Thirdly, we will present an overview of the causes of vertical integration, disintegration 
and reintegration of an industry in the current literature. 
2.1 The context 
The impact of technological change, such as the one stemming from information technology, is 
occurring at two levels: at the firm’s production and at the organizational levels. On the one hand, 
increased specialization has lead to a closer collaboration among the incumbent firms and their 
strategic partners and to a more integrated supply side (Quinn, 2000). Firms’ collaboration and their 
value chains’ integration have been further compounded by the diffusion of the information 
technology. On the other hand, the incumbent firms are faced with new dynamics on the demand side. 
The market has become more complex, as different consumers and other stakeholders such as 
regulators can directly access information from publicly available sources and demand changes.  
According to Arthur (1998), the organizational adaptation occurs at two levels: (a) internally, through 
a better management and coordination of internal resources and (b) externally, through the leverage 
and the management of inter-firm resources under long-term collaborative arrangements. In dynamic 
markets, some incumbent firms create competitive advantage by combining their internal resources 
and the use of complementary assets. Technological change brings new challenges, opportunities and 
threats in the balance of power among various stakeholders. Hence, the firm’s performance and the 
process of value creation are becoming more dependent upon strategic partners’ participation over 
time (Ritter & Gemünden, 2003).  
The increased collaboration among the incumbent firm and its network of strategic partners has 
encouraged the division of labor and the specialization among firms. As a result, some incumbent 
firms tend to leverage each other complementary assets and core capabilities. Thus, over time, the 
incumbent firm and its strategic partners tend to realize a portfolio of cross-disciplinary ‘core 
competences’ (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). A ‘networked organization’ structure emerged among firms 
by means of long-term collaborative arrangements. These contractual agreements include joint-
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ventures with equity stakes, research consortium, or loose partnerships with shared objectives. In this 
specific context, the incumbent firm’s competitiveness stems from the mobilization of the strategic 
partners’ complementary assets. Thus, the evolution of the incumbent firm as a networked 
organization and its ability to leverage the resources of its strategic partners, is posing new challenges 
to current theories of the firm and more particularly to the Resource Based View of the firm 
(Matthews, 2003). 
Hence, the value creation process occurs outside the incumbent firm’s traditional organizational 
boundaries (Zott & Amit, 2002). The incumbent firm sustains a few core capabilities through the 
leveraging of key strategic partners’ complementary resources. As a result, the incumbent firm 
becomes embedded in several networks of firms. Each firm specializes and leverages each other 
partners’ shared capabilities in order to sustain the long-term sustainability of the common ‘network 
capabilities’ (i.e., the common pools of resources among a group of firms via the traditional market 
mechanisms as a result of long-term collaborative arrangements). The realization of economies of 
scale is beneficial for the incumbent firm, as well as for its strategic partners. However, in a dynamic 
environment, the effects of technological change pose new challenges and issues among the groups of 
firms and their contribution to the long-term sustainability of the common network capabilities.  
Hence, the process leading to the market emergence of competition / collaboration is not properly 
understood in markets characterized by network externalities. In such a market, the compatibility of 
complementary technological assets (Teece, 1986) contributes to improve current technologies. In the 
Resource Based View of the firm (RBV), the future development of capabilities depends on several 
types of factors such as the timing of market entry in cases such as: the radio industry (Klepper and 
Simons, 2000), the semiconductor industry (Hoolbrook et al., 2000); the customers’ influences during 
the firm’s investment decision process (Helfat and Rautbistschek, 2000), the organizational learning 
(Winter, 2000, 2003) and the management of dynamic capabilities (i.e., the ability to manage 
organizational capabilities in a changing environment) (Teece et al., 1997).  
Indeed, the early stage of competition in a market with network externalities, such as the 
telecommunications industry, is about the future rents appropriation of a potential growth market. The 
competition in such an industry (Koski and Krestchmer, 2004) differs from others industries because 
of the need for collaboration and compatibility at the early stage of the technology diffusion (Arthur, 
1989). Therefore, in order to decrease the level of uncertainty, the innovative firm should ensure that 
the new technology specifications match the firm’s current capabilities and knowledge based 
competences (Anderson & Tushman, 1986). Thus, the pre-early market emergence is based more on 
collaboration among actors (Moore, 1993), the aim is to develop and to coordinate the production of 
compatible products. The pre-early phase of market dominance is coordinated among a group of firms; 
each participating firm contributes to shape the future industry characteristics within the common 
‘ecosystem’. Thus, competing ecosystems occur during an industry restructuring or during the 
emergence of a market (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). 
In this perspective, ‘collective competition’ (Gomes-Casseres, 2005) or ‘system competition’ (Shapiro 
& Varian, 1999) is neither about competition firm to firm or firms against other firms. This concept is 
about how strategic alliances impact the organization of an industry among groups of firms (Gomes-
Casseres, 2004). ‘Collective competition’ is defined as groups of allied firms against other groups 
instead of the traditional battle firm versus firm (Gomes-Casseres, 2005, Chap 2.3: 13). These forms 
of collaboration lead towards new relationships among firms and new tensions among partners in term 
5 
of governance, rent and power within the ‘constellation’ (Zott & Amit, 2002). The focus is on the 
interaction between competition and cooperation (Gomes-Casseres 2005, 2003). The author argues 
that competition in constellations is about focusing on three main aspects – the strategy, the 
governance and the dynamics. In this case, a group of actors is unified as a result of the division of 
labour and their specialization in offering complementary assets and competencies to the ‘ecosystem’. 
The study is about the extended value chain and the coordination mechanism of the integrated 
intangible network at the industry level. Few studies have looked at the impact of firm’s partnering 
decision in times of change (Gulati et Al., 2005) and how it may affect the industry boundaries. In 
high technology markets, firms developed a high dependence of complementary assets (Teece, 1986) 
in their final products, the embeddedness within a technological system results in firm’s specialization 
in a specific competence area within the network. 
This view of competition has been addressed in strategic network theory. There are three main aspects: 
(1) the structure, (2) the content, and (3) the governance of firms (Zott & Amit, 2002). 
This literature looks at answering three main questions: (a) why does a network of firms exit?, (b) 
Why does a network of firms differ in terms of size and scope of activities? and (c) why does a 
network of firms perform better than others? 
Strategic network theory considers the incumbent firm’s cooperative arrangements as a resource 
(Gulati et al, 2000). This stream of literature addresses how pools of firms share resources and 
capabilities outside their own organization’s boundaries, in order to sustain their competitive 
advantage (Gulati et al, 2000). In this perspective, resources are not acquired through competitive 
market mechanisms, but through mutual contractual arrangements between the incumbent firm and its 
strategic partners. Thus, this theory looks at how a firm leverage and share resources outside the 
organization boundaries via the network of partners (Gulati et al., 2000; Gulati et al., 2005). The 
network contributes to the firm’s competitive advantage. Specific issues are addressed in the literature 
such as:  
(1) the characteristics of the network and the different classifications of network forms (Cravens et al, 
1996);  
(2) the design structure of a network through the study of transaction exchanges between firms and 
their relationships (Zott & Amit, 2002);  
(3) the hierarchy among firms within the network, i.e., how the centrality within the network enables 
specific firms to extract rents from the network by letting other partners to access a shared resources;  
and (4) the knowledge between firms (Kogut, 2000). 
2.2 The shift of market boundaries and the effects of technological change 
on firm’s capabilities 
The literature about the incumbent firm and the effects of technological change focuses on the 
devastative consequences of the new technology on the incumbent’s main core capabilities. These 
approaches focused on the effects of technological change on an industry structure from the entrants’ 
strategies; nevertheless, little research addresses the incumbent firm’s response (Hill & Rothaermel, 
2003) and the ‘dynamics of strategy’ over time (Adner & Zemsky, 2002). 
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Indeed, technological change is characterized by a progressive diffusion across markets (Gilbert, 
2003) and has an endogenous element (Gatignon & Soberman, 2002, p.23) triggered by actors (firms, 
regulators, customers, suppliers, lobbying firms) within a technological system. Thus, management of 
innovation studies address one specific period of the technological change diffusion and its effects on 
the existing industry structure. Therefore, other parameters are not fully addressed such as the social, 
regulatory and the firms’ interactions in shaping their environment (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). 
Thus, most of the current studies do not assess properly the sources of the ‘pre-infant’ phase of 
technological change. This is because current studies consider technological change as an exogenous 
and uncontrolled variable. 
Within the management of innovation theory, there are two streams of research focusing on the effects 
of technological change on a firm’s capabilities.  
The first stream of research focuses on the causes of incumbent firm’s adaptation to technological 
change. Three alternative approaches derive from this first broad stream of research: 
• The first approach looks at the following aspects: the introduction of the effects of the technology 
on the industry structure (Anderson & Tushman, 1986; Henderson & Clark, 1990); the diffusion of 
a technological innovation over the product life cycle (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975) and the 
performance assessment of the new technology with the ‘S curve model’ (Foster, 1986).  
• The second approach look at the organizational capabilities and the reasons of ‘structural inertia’ 
within a large organization (Nelson & Winter, 1982); the entry timing and the investment decisions 
between entrants and incumbent firms in a particular subfields (Mitchell, 1989).  
• The third view approach refers to the firms’ position within a system; i.e., the ‘value network’ 
(Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995). 
The second stream of research focuses on the impact of technological change and the broader firm’s 
environment, to what extent key partner‘s capabilities (i.e., co-opetitors such as suppliers, customers, 
complementors, and alliance partners) may be affected by the effects of technological change and 
impact negatively the incumbent firm’s performance (Afuah, 1995, 2000). The ‘innovation 
hypercurve’ model (Afuah & Bahram, 1995) provides the multi-facets of an innovation, under which 
an innovation can impact differently actors located at the upstream and the downstream value chain. 
The model highlights the inter-firm linkages dependence. 
Overall, little attention is devoted to the pre-early stage of market competition. Specifically, how a 
group of firms within a technological system can shape or mould the future industry conditions (i.e., 
the sources of technological change and the firms’ strategies to shape the future characteristics of an 
industry). In this context, there are different categories of competition among actors and hierarchies 
within a technological system over time.  
The evolution of competition over time has different implications for the assessment of the industry 
boundaries and the firms’ strategic behaviors. Barney (1986) distinguishes an integrated framework 
among the typologies of competition in microeconomics literature (1) the Industrial organization 
perspective of competition, (2) the Chamberlinian competition and (3) the Schumpeterian competition. 
Therefore, competition has multiple facets during the industry evolution; from the birth, the 
development and the decline or the rejuvenation of an industry (Porter, 1980), during the technological 
innovation life cycle over time (Abernathy & Utterback, 1975). 
7 
In strategy literature, Porter’s five forces framework (Porter, 1980) is about the firm’s position and the 
interactions of underlying drivers within an industry. In this framework, the firm’s microeconomic 
environment and the interactions of different actors such as competitors, entrants, substitutes and 
suppliers lead towards the firm’s profitability in a given industry. From this perspective, the ‘structural 
analysis’ of a particular industry (Porter, 1980) is addressed during a stable environment. However, 
the traditional view is inadequate in an environment with high uncertainty (Li & Walley, 2002; Slater 
& Olson, 2002). This is specifically the case in industries characterized by network externalities, 
technological change and the implementation of a regulatory process, in which the industry structure is 
affected by a continuous process of change; namely, new dynamics, globalization, technological 
advances, deregulation of industries and the information technologies (Slater & Olson, 2002). The 
authors argue that unpredictable factors such as customers’ demand should be considered during the 
assessment of the industry’s profitability. 
Jaworski et al. (2000) distinguish also two streams of research with regard to the concept of market 
orientation:  
(1) a ‘market driven’ is about ‘learning, understanding, and responding to stakeholder perceptions 
and behaviors within a given market structure’. This perspective implies an understanding of a well 
defined market and firms serving existing customers.  
Whereas (2) a ‘driving market’ is referred as ‘changing the composition and/or roles of players in a 
market and/or the behaviours of players in the market’ (p: 47: 25). This second stream of research 
implies the firm’s ability to modify the current market structure according to its capabilities. The 
market-driven perspective contains three main approaches. The firm has the ability to shape the 
market structure by either modifying the value chain or by introducing new functions, new players or 
new business models. There are three approaches (1) the constructionist approach; (2) the 
deconstructionist approach, (3) the functional modification.  
1. The constructionist approach relates to the introduction of additional players through (a) the 
introduction of new players by forming business relationships with the common sharing of 
proprietary or compatible technologies (b) a deeper business relationships with other firms offering 
complementary assets. 
2. The deconstruction approach aims to affect the market structure by modifying the industry value 
chain. The strategic firm’s intent is to introduce new actors (i.e., wholesalers, distributors and 
complementors) along the value chain in order to increase the effectiveness of the supply side. The 
increase customer’s value is provided through:  
− The opening of a new channel of distribution and the implementation of a new business model 
through the elimination of players at the downstream of the value chain; 
− The introduction of process innovation leads to a decrease in the final cost per unit produced;  
− The decrease in the numbers of competitors in the market is achieved through mergers and 
acquisitions, joint-ventures, partnerships, takeovers;  
− The backward integration along the value chain enables a firm to compete with suppliers. 
3. The functional modification is about changing functions of players. The focal firm integrates a 
forward or backward integration through the control of specific aspects along the value chain either 
alone or with others firm’s strategic partners. From these three approaches, the focal firm can 
decide either to shape: 
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− The market behaviour directly by means of (a) proposing a new method / process to customers 
in doing something; (b) allowing the customers to access directly information; (c) imposing 
constraints to competitors through lobbying institutions in order to regulate or deregulate a 
specific market or to reach a near monopoly position in a specific market.  
− To shape the market indirectly by means of (a) creating new customer preferences and affecting 
the product offerings available in the market and thus changing the customers’ demand; (b) 
letting the customers discover new products functionalities. 
Even tough, this perspective of market orientation has been applied to the business unit of the firm. 
This perspective provides insights about firms’ strategic behaviors in influencing directly or indirectly 
the future market characteristics (Jaworski et al., 2000). 
McGahan (2004) argues that firms should assess the evolution of their industry path in order to select 
effective strategies. The author distinguishes four industry trajectories: radical, progressive, creative 
and intermediating. Each phase may impact either the industry’s core activities or core assets. Hence, 
the categorization of different types of industry structures is explained in relation with the types of 
changes. 
1. The impact of radical changes of an industry trajectory tends to affect progressively both core 
assets and core activities of the industry structure. These changes result from changes such as a 
new technology in the market or the deregulation of monopolistic industries (Telecommunications, 
Energy, Water, Post, Airlines). These changes modify the market mechanisms of the industry by 
reconfiguring existing relationships among actors. 
2. An intermediating change of an industry trajectory occurs when core activities of an industry are 
threatened by the emergence of substitutes. These changes modify the relationship at the upstream 
and the downstream of the value chain and substitute channels of distribution encourage the 
implementation of new business models in the industry. Generally, these changes are difficult to 
perceive because specific aspects of the value chain are modified without affecting the entire 
industry.  
3. A creative change of an industry trajectory impacts the core assets of the industry. However, the 
relationship between customers and suppliers remains unchanged.  
4. A progressive change of an industry trajectory modifies the core assets and the core activities are 
not threatened by these incremental changes. 
McGahan highlights these four industry trajectories. An alternate model of the industry is presented 
where two concurrent industry trajectories (i.e., an established and an emerging industry structures) 
are evolving concurrently over time. In this model, the author distinguishes four phases – emergence, 
convergence, coexistence and dominance – and the necessity to analyze the evolution of different 
markets. 
Overall, market dynamics studies are reassessing the traditional industry perspective. These studies 
provide us with an insight regarding markets’ evolution, the different industry trajectories related to 
changes and uncertainty from the broader firm’ s environment and firms’ strategic behaviors and the 
coordination process among actors in the case of market restructuring. 
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2.3 Overview of the causes of vertical integration, disintegration and re-
integration of an industry 
An industry evolution undergoes different stages as the result of the modifications of the industry 
structure. In this part, we present an overview of the causes leading towards the vertical integration, 
disintegration and reintegration of an industry structure, presented in the current literature.  
1. The causes of vertical integration of an industry: In economic literature, vertical integration 
leads to an increase of customers’ welfare, a standardization of demand whenever the strategic 
firms’ behaviors are low (Krafft, 2003). From this perspective, causes of vertical integration are 
due to the difficulty in the transfer of knowledge, the need for standardization of information and 
the decrease of transaction costs, a low appropriation of innovation rents (Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005), 
the specific assets of the resources and the ‘hold-up situation’ (Williamson, 1985). The Resource 
Based View attributes the existence of vertical integration in order to control the knowledge outside 
the firm (Teece, 1986). 
2. The causes of vertical disintegration of an industry: Different factors can lead to the vertical 
disintegration of the value chain, namely, technological change, the implementation of new 
business models and a changing market structure (Stern, 1998), ‘the technological opportunities, 
cumulativeness of new knowledge, transferability of knowledge and appropriability conditions of 
the innovations’ (Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005, p:1).  
 The authors propose ‘a dynamic theory of the vertical boundaries of the firm and its impact on the 
industry structure’ and strategic firms’ responses in a ‘deconstruction industry’. The authors argue 
that ‘previous studies have neglected the effects of vertical integration on market structure and 
industrial dynamics by focusing the analysis on an individual representative firm, therefore fail to 
capture the wider implications of vertical disintegration’ (p: 3) and “how an industry’s conditions 
technological change affect deconstruction of the value chain, the selection of business models and 
the evolution of market structures’ (p.1). Hence, a strategic framework is proposed in order to 
measure the effects of firm’s coordination and strategic behaviors during a period of technological 
change on the industry structure. 
 The deconstruction approach (Stern, 1998) reassesses the industry value chain and the factors 
leading to changes in the vertical disintegration of the value chain and the emergence of new 
intermediaries, the impact of the information technologies and the collaboration among firms 
during the innovation process. In this perspective, there are two impacts on the organization of a 
market among actors with regard to (1) rents appropriation of an innovation; (2) the customers and 
the suppliers’ relationships. These patterns of change have transformed the organization of the 
industry value chain (Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005) with new business models and coordination 
mechanisms among firms’ partners. Thus, market transition in an industry is a challenge and an 
opportunity for vertically integrated incumbent firms (Stern, 1998) because of new functions within 
the value chain and changing dynamics among actors such as (a) the orchestrator (Edelman & 
Henskel, 1999) and (b) the navigator (Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005). 
3. The causes of vertical re-integration of an industry: Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005) present 
possible explanations about the reasons of a re-integration process in the building industry due to 
the following reasons: (1) changes in the demand structure, (2) changes in the professions, (3) 
firms’ strategy and positioning, (4) entering into new markets, and (5) the implementation of new 
processes aiming at leveraging existing firm’s capabilities. 
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 Overall, there are different causes of vertical integration, disintegration and reintegration of an 
industry structure. These changes affect the industry boundaries and some of these factors are 
endogenous and industry characteristics. This literature provides insights about the causes of these 
changes within the organization of an industry. The second part of the paper provides an overview 
of the context and the key players in the European telecommunications industry. 
3. THE CONTEXT AND THE KEY PLAYERS IN THE EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
The liberalization process reflects the changing institutional structure, the context, the evolution and 
dynamics in European telecommunications markets. In this context, the progressive liberalization of 
different market segments emerged from an ‘engineered competition’ (Helsink & Wuben, 2003). 
Thus, the longitudinal study provides us with a good retrospective of firms’ strategic behaviors within 
the industry. Finally, the re-integration process has several implications for public policies. The 
industry liberalization was to disintegrate the former monopolistic value chain and to provide 
incentives to entrants in the industry.  
In this paper, we argue that the emergence of the vertical re-integration of the industry is the result of 
the co-evolution of technologies and market dynamics. Even tough, regulation led to the industry 
partitioning, other specific factors are also industry specific such as the governance structures among 
groups of firms over time and the co-evolution of technologies. These factors contribute to understand 
why actors are willing or being forced to re-integrate at different levels of the value chain.  
Industry regulation serves to ensure that actors comply with a common set of market rules in order to 
ensure fair trading and to protect the consumers’ welfare within a defined boundary. As such, the 
liberalization of the European telecommunication markets is based on economic regulation. The 
Commission is the regulatory authority in charge of the regulatory framework and the opening of the 
market competition. This ‘engineered competition’ (Hulsink & Wubben, 2003) was implemented 
progressively at different stages. The early stage of the market was characterized by an asymmetric 
regulation. One of the main objectives of such regulatory measures was to provide new entrants with 
several market-based incentives, to protect the consumer’s welfare and to guarantee the Universal 
Service Obligation (USO) by imposing to the incumbent operator; among other restrictions, the 
obligation to provide a minimum set of high quality services at an affordable price (EC 96 C 281/03). 
The relationships between the institutional context and the firms’ strategies provide a better 
understanding about the reasons firms from different layers in the European telecommunications 
industry have started to re-integrate and are affecting the overall industry structure. 
The second part of the paper is structured as follows: the first part introduces the role of institutions in 
shaping the European telecommunications industry. Each phase represents an evolution of the market 
restructuring as the result of the liberalization process. 
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3.1 The role of institutions in shaping the European telecommunications 
industry 
Public institutions have shaped the European telecommunications industry in two ways. First, the 
liberalization was to open the European telecommunication markets to competition and at the same 
time, to impose to the incumbent firm, the obligation to provide a minimum level of basic services to 
the consumers. Secondly, the creation of various research and development programs: the 
implementation, coordination and the financial commitments towards cooperative research and 
development programs in the field of communications technologies are concrete illustrations. All in 
all, the objective of such initiatives was to protect the long term interest of consumers, but most 
importantly, to sustain the long term competitiveness of the European telecommunications industry 
and to coordinate the emergence of common specifications among actors in a more integrated market.  
The liberalization of the telecommunications industry in Western Europe was part of a long gradual 
process of the political construction of an integrated European market. First, the Treaty of Rome 
established the European Community on Economic and Trade issues among Member States. Then, the 
White Paper on ‘completing the internal market’ (COM 35 (85) 310 Final) initiated the early stage 
towards a common regulatory framework for the European telecommunications sector. Later, the 
European integration was further accomplished with the final negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty 
among Member States, with the creation of a single market and the Euro zone. The Maastricht Treaty 
had further implications for the European telecommunications policy as well as other sectors in 
network industries – Transport and Energy – among the aim was the development of a Trans-
European Networks for Telecommunications (TEN – Telecom). The core objective of such an 
initiative was to lay down the future foundation for the accomplishment of an integrated market 
through a harmonized infrastructure across Europe by means of Pan-European interconnected 
networks and services (Chapter XII of the Treaty).  
The overall liberalization process and harmonization in the European telecommunications industry 
contains four gradual phases. Each phase represents a more integrated European market1 with the 
emergence of institutions and a common European telecommunications regulatory framework. The 
management roll-out of the liberalization process of the telecommunications sector in Western Europe 
represent one of the many steps towards the establishment of a future supranational State: the 
European Union. We will present four phases of the European telecommunications industry: 
a. Establishing a common harmonization: from 1984 to 1987; 
b. From monopoly to progressive competition: from 1987 to 1998; 
                                                     
1  There are six levels for the integration of a market. Each level corresponds to a degree of integration between 
Member States.  
Level 1: Preferential Trade Area (To decrease of EC tariffs); 
Level 2: Free Trade Area (To eliminate tariffs in an area such as the intra European Free Trade Agreement 
(The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 
Level 3: Customs Union (To establish a free trade zone with external tariffs example: EU and Turkey 
agreement); 
Level 4: A single (Common) market (To select a common policies on products and regulation and freedom of 
movements); 
Level 5: Economic and Monetary Union (To adopt a common policies on Economics and single currency);  
Level 6: Complete integration (To integrate the Economic, Monetary and political aspects of the market by 
establishing a Supranational State).       (Source: Wikipedia.com) 
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c. The 1998 package and asymmetric regulation: from 1998 to 2002; 
d. The application of competition law in the common regulatory framework since 2003. 
3.1.1 Establishing a common harmonization: from 1984 to 1987 
Prior to liberalization, the European telecommunications industry was a fragmented market, as most of 
the other network industries (Energy, post, water and transport). Each of these industries was a public 
services enterprise, operating under a monopoly market with the objective to provide exclusively 
public services. Their financial budgets were included in each annual national industrial policy. The 
creation of common European initiatives aimed at promoting the roll-out of common European 
activities in the telecommunications industry in Europe. Theses initiatives were reflected into four 
main areas (Source: DG information Society, 1999).  
(1) To harmonize the market: the development of common standards was selected over national 
specifications;  
(2) to promote common European programs;  
(3) to fund under developed part of Europe: the management of European structural funds with 
common programs;  
And (4) to proclaim a common position at the international level: the European Community on 
telecommunications issues was a step in that direction. 
This early phase established the pillars of the liberalization in the European telecommunications 
markets with a common policy among all Member States. During this phase, the Commission drew the 
main road map of the liberalization process by breaking-up the telecommunications industry into 
distinctive markets. The Green Paper on ‘the development of the common market for 
telecommunications services and equipment’ (COM (87) 290 final) initiated the public consultative 
debate about an integrated economic and regulatory European market.  
3.1.2 From monopoly to progressive competition: from 1987 to 1998 
During this second phase, the gradual liberalization process in the telecommunications markets 
occurred at the services and infrastructure levels. The focus was to open a previous monopolistic 
market to competition, to define the rights of new entrants, to access the market and to impose 
restrictions to the former monopolistic entity. This important document drew upon two main 
regulatory texts: The White Paper on the Single Market and the EC Treaty Competition rules. There 
were two types of directives. The first type was about tackling the liberalisation aspect of the market. 
The second type was about the market harmonization. 
The entry of new actors in the different market segments liberalized (i.e., terminal equipment, satellite 
communications, value added services, mobile telephony, the network infrastructure, the voice 
telephony) was followed by prices adjustments in order to maintain universal services to consumers 
(COM (96) 73). 
At the international level, the ratification of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) dealt 
about trading of services among members of the World Trade Organization. The annex on 
telecommunications in GATS 1997, defined the principles of ‘basic telecommunications services’ 
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(i.e., voice telephone services, data transmission services, mobile transmission services, personal 
communication systems and so on). This document is important in the telecommunications related to 
liberalization and deregulation policies of services among WTO members. The article XVIII offered 
regulatory principles related to licensing, interconnection, radio frequency, numbering, standards, and 
tariffs. These binding conditions are applied to any countries in the process of liberalization or to 
provide licenses under these principles. Indeed, an international treaty always prevails over national 
laws. 
3.1.3 The 1998 package and asymmetric regulation: from 1998 to 2002 
The 1998 regulatory package developed over a ten year liberalization process of the European 
telecommunications sector. The main objective was to implement the early stage of the telecoms 
markets liberalization through the implementation of an asymmetric regulation. This phase defined the 
rights of the new entrants, imposed restrictions to the historical operator with the obligation to open its 
network infrastructure and to maintain Universal Service Obligations (USO) to consumers (Cave & 
Prosperitti, 2001). During this process, several dynamics became stronger such as the fast rate of 
technological development and new entrants into the liberalised telecommunications market. 
The 1999 Communications review was about redefining the current regulatory framework and to 
establish the foundation of a liberalised market. The next phase of competition was about the 
assessment of the effect of economic regulation and the emergence of competition across liberalised 
markets. Thus, the market forces at play would shape the telecommunications sector, in which new 
entrants and incumbent firms (former monopoly operator) were to increase their level of innovation 
and their ability to strategize in order to gain market shares in their respective markets but also to 
shape potentially profitable growth markets. 
3.1.4 Competition law and the common regulatory framework since 2003 
The objective of the new regulatory framework was about the development of competition in the 
European telecommunications market, to levy the asymmetric regulation imposed upon incumbent 
firms, and to simplify the legal instruments. 
In this phase, the regulatory authority encouraged a market based competition with the further 
implementation of competition law principles. The new regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Network (2002/21/EC) led towards a decrease of regulatory measures. Thus, 
competition issues were related to market dominance and firm’s conduct and behaviour among 
players. The new regulatory framework provides incentives to the incumbent firm and entrants to 
deploy innovative strategies and the emergence of new actors and interdependent value network of 
partners’ relationships (Li & Whalley, 2002) at the micro level and de facto at the industry level. 
4. THE EUROPEAN MOBILE AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT AND 
THE CASE OF THE FIXED MOBILE CONVERGENCE (FMC) 
The study of the European mobile telephony market aimed at understanding to what extent variables 
such as technology, regulation and market dynamics have led towards the early vertical re-integration 
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process between different layers of the telecommunications markets. Two major events occurred in the 
mobile industry: First, in the 1970’s with the use of the semiconductors in the mobile handsets; 
secondly, in the 1980’s with the adoption of the GSM standard, the single European standard. 
This part will distinguish two phases: the first part is before the liberalization when the 
telecommunications industry evolved from a vertical integration towards a vertical disintegration of 
the industry since the industry deregulation. Then, the second part focuses from disintegration to the 
early stage of re integration of the industry because of the co-evolution and the technologies 
integration in the manufacturing of the mobile handsets, the different firms’ strategies in shaping a 
future market or leading markets restructuring at the forward or the backward of the value chain alone 
or with strategic partners through collaborative arrangements on common research and development 
projects, strategic alliances or acquisitions of firm’s owner of complementary technology 
competences. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the European telecommunications industry structure. 
4.1 From integration to disintegration: the influence of regulation 
Prior to the liberalization of the European telecommunications markets, each aspect of the value chain 
of the industry was vertically integrated as the result of a monopolize market. Each government was 
the asset owner of the value chain. The industry structure was characterized by a vertical integration 
among players and the absence of competition. 
The layer model approach enables a distinction among players according to their activities, how firms 
develop their capabilities and analyze the vertical integration among players within an industry over 
time (Krafft, 2003, p.632). According to Fransman (2001), before the liberalization process, the 
telecommunications value chain was composed of the equipment suppliers (network, switches), 
network operators (infrastructures) and services (voice and fax transmissions) layers. Indeed, the 
European telecommunications markets liberalization was to dismantle the prior industry structure with 
the absence of competition, by letting new entrants to compete for market shares.  
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In this context, the liberalization of the mobile market started with the consultative debate about the 
mobile and telecommunications markets (Green Paper COM (94) 145). The interconnection in the 
telecommunications industry is characterized by the selection requirement of a common standard in 
order to ensure operability and roaming in the different Member States. In Europe, the selection of a 
common standard was chosen among the different technologies available at that time. In 1980, Global 
System for Mobile Communication (GSM) became the European standard and allowed a pan-
European roaming.  
4.2 From Disintegration to re-integration: the influence of market 
dynamics and the co-evolution of technologies 
According to Fransman (2001), after the liberalization, the Telecoms industry structure was 
characterized by additional layers providers of new activities and products offerings. 
Layer 1: equipment and software suppliers (i.e., switches, transmission equipment, routers, servers, 
billing software); 
Layer 2: network operators (management of the fixed and mobile telephony infrastructures and 
services, internet and multimedia);  
Layer 3: connectivity (Internet Service providers (ISPs): internet access and services providers of web 
hosting facilities);  
Layer 4: navigation and middleware (firms providing search engines, browsers, portals, security, 
electronic payments, firewall and data protection services);  
Layer 5: applications content (Web designers, e-commerce, information services and broadcasting 
content production and services). 
The evolutionary trajectory path of this industry is defined by the presence of innovations within 
specific layers, the diffusion and the market growth / cross industry effects (Sabat, 2002), the 
information technologies, the improvement in semiconductors and fiber optic technologies, the 
advances in software applications. These developments led towards many improvements in 
infrastructure telecommunications networks and services. The mobile handsets became complex 
multi-technology products and firms started specializing in specific technology fields, leading towards 
a further division of tasks and knowledge among actors. New players entered the markets as the result 
of the progressive markets liberalization in equipment manufacturers, infrastructures and services.  
Innovation, evolving capabilities and specialization were pushing different groups of firms to adapt to 
a changing environment through long term collaborative arrangements and the leveraging of partners’ 
competences and complementary assets. This is specifically the case within (i.e. vertical integration) 
and between (i.e., vertical specialization) layers of the telecommunications industry (i.e., the 
partitioning of the industry is defined in terms of the coordination of activities within and between 
different segments. 
4.2.1 The co-evolution of technologies 
During the industry life cycle, an industry undergoes major transformation and evolutionary phases 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1986) under which the industry structure is shaped by the number of players 
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(Porter, 1980), the diffusion of the new technology is moving from product innovations towards a 
more oriented process innovations (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), the technology diffuses in a path 
trajectory (Dosi, 1982). Different types of innovations emerge in the market, either to improve the 
current technology’s performance in the market or to reconfigure the technology specificities (i.e., 
incremental, disruptive, sustaining, radical, architectural, modular) (Anderson & Tushman, 1990, 
Henderson & Clark, 1990; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Christensen & Bower, 1996).  
Tushman & Rosenkopf (1992) analyzed the emergence of technological progress and the dynamics 
evolution and interactions across political, organizational and social influences interactions over time. 
The authors argued that the social aspect and the surrounding environment of the technology, 
including the interactions among different actors contribute in shaping the outcome of technological 
progress. Thus, a better understanding about the influence of different actors and their 
interdependencies such as firms, community of practices, institutions, and lobbying groups enables an 
analysis of the process leading to the emergence of new technologies and technological system. 
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Figure 2: Shaping the industry structure in a dynamic environment. 
The case of the Research and Development programs in the European telecommunications industry is 
a good illustration about how institutions influence the future shape of a market by offering different 
forms of incentives. The objective of a technology policy is to provide financial and non-financial 
incentives towards targeted research and development programs to various stakeholders. During the 
liberalization of the European telecommunications markets, several initiatives were created with the 
objective to advance the development of fundamental research in specific technology areas. The 
influence of institutions was an important component in shaping markets and sponsoring the 
development of new technologies. 
Overall, the main objective of such initiatives, at the community level, was to provide incentives to 
different actors – public institutions, communities of practices and private enterprises – in order to 
invest towards specific fundamental research in the fields of communications. These initiatives were 
targeted to provide EU financing and to contribute to subsidize additional costs from fundamental 
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research, to develop content production for emerging technologies. The most important aspect of such 
a public policy was the indirect establishment of common European standards among participants in 
order to achieve interoperability, to create the conditions of a long term competitive market and to 
‘push’ technological progress. Indeed, the level of innovative activities could be achieved through 
financial and non financial incentives. So, different actors in a market could direct their attention 
towards the development of specific technological innovations. Thus, public institutions contributed 
actively to encourage the process of the future characteristics of emerging technologies in the 
European telecommunications industry through initiatives such as the management and the 
coordination of European cooperative Research and development programs in the fields of 
communications.  
The selection of a particular technology standard, at the regulatory level from the Commission, 
involved long term investments from different actors in the mobile industry, such as telecoms 
operators, equipment manufacturers and service providers. The choice of a technology standard 
required the actors’ strong financial commitments and led towards the resource allocation in R&D 
programs, employees’ training and so on. Thus, an ecosystem formed around a common technology 
standard in order to promote interoperability, but most importantly, to ensure economies of scale in 
order to realize profitability. In short, the long term commitment to a particular technology standard 
leads an industry to a certain path-trajectory (Dosi, 1982), and the back up of institutions in order to 
promote this technology through the funding of common research development programs by means of 
the deliverance of funding grants to Universities. Hence, in this case, it is about the selection of a 
systemic perspective of innovation. 
4.2.2 The European mobile telephony 
The mobile telephony value chain is composed of the following actors: equipment manufacturers, 
network operators, terminal device suppliers. For each generation of technologies, there had been a 
reconfiguration of power within the value chain among actors. These changes occurred across the 
telecommunications industry because of the different technologies evolution in other industries and 
innovations from different levels of the mobile industry value chain. The mobile telecommunications 
has undergone through three technology transitions and a fourth generation of technology is at an early 
stage of development.  
1. The first generation of technology was from 1915 to 1925, with the introduction of radio 
technology and the voice transmission. 
2. The second generation of technology was from 1925 to 2003 with the 2G and 2, 5G.  
During this period, major technological improvements occurred in the fields of software and hardware 
developments, the transition from analogue technology to digital technology voice networks and the 
diffusion of the microelectronics revolution with the emergence of the semiconductor technology. The 
increasing performance of these technologies led mobile manufacturers to improve the characteristics 
of the mobile handsets; network operators could offer additional types of services and generate more 
revenues from services such as Short Message Service (SMS) to their customers. This limited data 
transmission and messaging systems were possible and products designs reflected these changes with 
the introduction of in-built camera phones, ring tones download, and so on. 
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3. The third generation of technology was from 2003 to current, this phase represented the launch of 
high speed data transmission, the true convergence of multi media contents with the videophones. 
The emergence of this market has required long term financial commitments, in some countries, 
telecoms operators had to purchase a 3G license from national government, and committed to build 
the necessary infrastructures with the transmission equipments and networks, the set up of new 
generations of antennae based on a different frequency than the 2, 5 Generation technology. Many 
wireless technologies alternatives are available in mobile industry.  
In Europe, the third Generation of mobile communications systems is built on the Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications Systems (UMTS). This technology standard requires the development of 
complementary technologies and infrastructure networks such as a broadband technologies and the 
production of multimedia content and services. European initiatives encouraged such an infrastructure 
development. As such, the selection of the UMTS standard led to the establishment of a regulatory 
policy in partnership with the main industry players. The adoption of a framework was to lay down the 
foundation of a common approach in the fields of mobile market and personal communications.  
The adoption of a European common policy in the mobile market served to co-ordinate the 
introduction of UMTS and to allocate a limited number of ‘scarce resources’ (i.e., frequencies a 
limited number of licenses) and to provide incentives for the development of this emerging market. 
The main objective of such an initiative was to continue the development of a Pan European network 
and to include the mobile communications market as part of the implementation of the Trans-
European Telecommunications Networks in the context of a competitive market (TEN – Telecom). 
Indeed, the impact of the UMTS market is posing new challenges to other telecommunication markets, 
the necessity of the coordination among others initiatives such as the numbering systems between 
fixed-line and mobile (Green paper on numbering policy) and the development of an information 
society. 
4.2.3 The mobile manufacturers and the mobile operator relationship 
The relationships between mobile manufacturers and mobile operators evolve over time as the result 
of the changes in the industry at the regulatory level, the progressive markets liberalization and the fast 
rate of innovation and diffusion of technologies within the industry. The mobile network operators 
focused on tackling the exponential growth of mobile services by increasing their marketing and 
branding activities, investing in mobile communications infrastructures and implementing organisation 
efficiency. 
From a technical side, the GSM standard allowed terminal manufacturer suppliers (Alcatel, Motorola, 
Nokia, Siemens and Ericsson) to levy entry barriers against foreign competitors by acquiring 
complementary technologies, increasing their research and development expenditures and establishing 
technology strategic alliances and realising economies of scale and scope in Europe. Thus, a vertical 
specialization occurred between the network operators and the equipment suppliers (Gerum at Al, 
2004, p. 9). Firms behave differently and new entrants from others industries entered new business 
such as Microsoft. As such, Nokia entered the network equipment business because Microsoft entered 
the mobile operating system business by moving their expertise into the mobile operating system 
(Sabat, 2002). Nokia broadened its competences into four areas of businesses (1) by delivering mobile 
handsets to network operators, (2) to be present in media technology applications, (3) security 
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expertise to business enterprises solutions and (4) network infrastructures by offering services to 
mobile operators (source: Nokia.com). 
As the mobile phones diffused and a dominant design (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975) emerged in the 
industry, the competition came from the downstream of the mobile telephony value chain. 
Manufacturing suppliers started to move forward the value chain by providing directly to network 
operators their own version of the handsets (example: Samsung corporation , a Korean firm). These 
changes modify the relationship among players, mobile operators worked closely with manufacturers 
regarding customising mobile handsets and imposing their own label into the handsets. Thus, 
collaborative Research and Development arrangements occurred between mobile manufacturers and 
mobile operators.  
Furthermore, in western markets, the mobile handsets product life cycle reached a maturity stage. This 
situation pushed the established manufacturers such as Nokia and Motorola, to broaden their 
competences into emerging technologies and to broaden their expertise. The mobile handset became a 
multi technology product with increasing functionalities (Sabat, 2002). Thus, the process of 
technology convergence started, in which handsets manufacturers either acquired complementary 
assets, merged with another firm (Sony / Ericsson) or directed their research and development into 
new areas such as multimedia applications. 
The integration of various components technologies and a deconstruction of the industry were taking 
place in which modularity and standardisation of technology interfaces enabled different suppliers to 
provide different components to mobile manufacturers. Partnerships in the mobile telephony industry 
increased (Sabat, 2002, p.515) in which mobile manufacturers became ‘systems integrators’ (Bruisoni, 
Prencipe & Pavitt, 2001) with the emergence of interface and modularity of component technologies 
to integrate. For example, Nokia kept core technology know how, built a ‘system capabilities’ 
enabling to integrate different interfaces (Stieglitz, 2003) but outsourced most of the production of its 
handsets to its suppliers located in different parts of the world, increased its levels of strategic 
alliances with specialised firms offering complementary technology assets.  
The table below showed some examples of functions, firms select in order to shape a market. Jaworski 
et al. explained that firms can select to modify the characteristics of a market and the industry structure 
through specific targeted actions. 
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Table 1: Examples of different functions performed by firms in order to shape a market structure and impact at 
the industry structure. 
Actors Tasks and requirements 
Business model and 
competitive advantage Products 
Competences and 
skills 
‘Vertical integrators’ 
(Afuah, 2001)  
Or ‘orchestrator’ 
(Edelman & Heuskel, 
1999) 
Example: Mobile 
manufacturer (layer 1) 
Nokia 
Integration of modular 
components and inter 
face standardization 
(Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996) from different 
layers into a product 
systems 
‘System integrator’ (Bruisoni et 
al., 2001) 
Brand, reputation, distribution 
channels and marketing 
Products systems 
Mobile handset 
product 
- To control the 
‘integration system’ 
- To understand the 
technological 
developments of the 
industry’s value chain 
- To select a portfolio 
of players 
- To integrate the layer 
players (Rosenberg, 
1990) 
‘Layer player’ 
(Eldeman, 1999) 
Examples: Layer 1 of 
the telecommunica-
tions industry 
(Microsoft, Intel) 
Specialist To establish the technology as the 
industry standard by diffusing, 
cross licensing the technology, 
leading the future applications of 
the technology 
Effect on the industry structure:  
Vertical disintegration of the 
industry (Brühl & Stieglitz, 2005) 
Core component 
within a product with 
modularity functions. 
Example: Operating 
system standard 
Expertise skills in a 
technology knowledge 
Owner of the 
technology 
‘Navigator’ 
(Brülh and Stiegliz, 
2005) 
Customize products 
offerings 
Gather information from different 
suppliers 
Repackage product 
components 
Information facilitator 
4.2.4 The Fixed Mobile Convergence (FMC) 
The Fixed Mobile Convergence (FMC) is ‘the integration of wireline and wireless technologies and 
services’ offered by network operators in order to allow consumers to make communications calls by 
using seamlessly both networks. 
Furthermore, the diffusion of substitute infrastructure networks based on different sets of technologies 
such as mobile and internet have contributed to the reconfiguration of the current industry landscape 
(Sabat, 2002). The fixed / mobile convergence is an example of the technological evolution between 
two markets, in which specific parts of different layers of the telecommunications industry are at the 
early stage of a reintegration process, at different levels of the industry value chain. The fixed / mobile 
convergence illustrates about the convergence between two markets in the telecommunications 
industry. The industry re – integration is due to the co-evolution of technologies in the wireless and the 
wireline applications and innovations in the telecommunications data / services. 
To recall, in Europe, some of the mobile operators are also owner of the fixed line business (France 
Télécom and Orange, SwissCom and Swiss mobile, British Telecoms and O2). The growth of the 
mobile business has been growing since the early 1990’s. New business models are emerging under 
which firms are collaborating across various layers of the telecommunications industry in order to 
establish the standard, to develop content applications, to develop network infrastructures, dual mode 
phones and so on. In different layers, firms can select different functions in order to shape the future 
characteristics of the FMC market based on their current capabilities, either by increasing their 
partnerships with different actors in different layers of the telecommunications industry. Opportunities 
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are occurring at different levels, for software providers, the FMC platform can be based on proprietary 
technology or open source applications. There are several opportunities in which firms can decide to 
select a forward integration across different market segments of the telecommunications value chain 
either by acquiring or collaborating together with the aim at delivering integrated services (Ciancetta 
et al, 1999).  
 
Figure 3: The evolution of the fixed and mobile markets. 
The mobile trajectory path is increasing whereas the fixed line trajectory is constant (OECD, 2005). 
As a substitute technology, many customers are using their mobile handsets in order to make 
communications or looked for information from their portable devices. In the long term, the mobile 
trajectory will overtake the fixed line trajectory.  
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have observed the early reintegration process of the European telecommunications as 
the result of the co-evolution of technologies and market dynamics in a highly regulated environment. 
We have emphasized on the difficulty of assessing the industry boundaries because of the complexity 
interactions between technologies co-evolution and the shift in the value of resources among actors 
over time. 
We illustrate our argument on the basis of two empirical cases from the European telecommunications 
industry. The first case looked at the history dependency and the evolutionary relationships between 
mobile manufacturers and mobile operators since the progressive deregulation of these two markets. 
The second case illustrates the evolution of the fixed and mobile markets, more specifically, on the 
fixed / mobile convergence. The substitutability among markets, technologies and the convergence of 
market boundaries over time are a good illustration of the early reintegration process between the 
fixed line and the mobile markets. Indeed, these two empirical evidences considered the changing 
dynamics occurring in the industry structure as the result of institutional influences, the evolution of 
different types of resources and technology components which are shifting the competitive advantage 
among firms over time. Thus, the study of several path technology trajectories illustrate cases of firms’ 
strategic behaviors whenever the industry is being restructured or new markets about to be created in a 
highly regulated environment. 
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Overall, the paper highlights that in the case of the re-shaping of an industry, competition is not 
always the drivers. By highlighting the causes leading toward an industry transformation process from 
a systemic perspective, the paper draws the importance of collaboration among firms in times of 
change with the aim of future rents appropriation among a group of firms. A future research in this 
area will be to look into the diffusion of the internet and the potential impact on the current evolving 
telecommunications industry. As such, the emergence of VOIP services (Voice Over Internet 
Protocol) is posing new threats to the telecommunications industry with the arrival of new players 
such as E-bay and the acquisition of Skype, a provider of internet telephony (The Economist, Sept. 
2005). The study of new entrants’ business models may be an avenue to look at the outcome of 
another technology substitution as the result of the co-evolution of technologies in the field of 
communications such as network infrastructures and software development applications. This 
illustration may provide further insights into the mechanisms leading towards the European 
telecommunications industry re-integration. 
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OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BY THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
Regulatory measures Goal and content Documents 
 
The 1987-1998 regulatory framework *  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Verrue, R. (1999) Telecoms 
liberalization: key issues from the 
European point of view’, January 1999. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/information_soc
iety/speeches/verrue/telecomlib_en.htm 
 
To set up the regulatory framework in which the 
conditions of competition in the market will apply to 
firms. 
 
Key aspects:  
(1)Interconnection of networks in order to allow 
interoperability and harmonization of the voice 
telephony services in the EU 
(2) Defining the concept of Universal Service 
Obligation (USO) 
(3) Establishing the Common Regulatory Framework 
for authorization and licensing. Documents drawn 
from the licensing Directive and the Full Competition 
Directive  
(4) Establishing the National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) in Member States 
 
Green Paper 1987 is composed of the White 
Paper single  
 
Market and EC Treaty Competition rules , 
 
Article 100a Directives and decisions from 
the Council and the European Parliament 
 
Article 90 Directives from the Commission  
 
Regulatory framework  
The 1998 legislative package on the 
liberalization and harmonization of the 
telecoms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 1999 Communication Review  
 
 
- Creation of a competitive market 
- Encourage new entrants to provide services in the 
telecoms 
- Authorise access to the incumbent network 
infrastructure 
- Maintain the basic universal services  
- Defining the right to new entrants. 3 types: (1) 
control of retail prices; (2) control of access prices, 
(3) Universal Services Obligations (Cave & 
Prosperitti, 2001) 
- Cooperation between sector specific regulators and 
competition authorities at National and European 
Levels  
 
The 1998 Legislative package is composed 
of the Liberalization Directives and 
Harmonization Directives: 
- Licensing Directive (97/13/EC) 
- Open Network Provision (ONP): 
(1) ONP Framework (Directive 97/51/EC) 
(2) Data protection (Directive 97/66/EC) 
(3) Interconnection (Directive 97/33/EC) 
(4) Voice Telephony (Directive 98/10/EC) 
(5) Leased lines (Directive 97/51/EC) 
 
 
 
Implementation reports: 
- Implementation of regulatory requirements; 
- Licenses and interconnections; 
- Local access; Universal services;  
- Mobile services; 
- Tariffs, cost and accounting; 
- Leased lines; 
- Data protection and access.  
 
The new regulatory package Framework 
Directive(2002/21/EC)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2005 Communications Review (to be 
expected) 
 
Response to technological and markets convergence  
Reduction of the degree of regulation through a 
decrease of legal instruments in the functioning of the 
market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An evaluation of the regulatory framework currently 
in place as the result of the changes in the 
telecommunications market.  
 
Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) and 
Four Directives: 
(1) Access and Interconnection Directive 
(2002/19/EC) 
(2) Authorization Directive (2002/20/EC)  
(3) Universal Directive (2002/22/EC)  
(4) Electronic Communications privacy and 
data protection (Directive 2002/58/EC) 
Recommendations and guidelines: 
(a) Competition in the markets  
(Commission Directive 2002/77/EC) 
(b) Unbundled access to the local loop 
regulation EC No 2887/2000 
(c) Market analysis  and the significant 
market power ( Commission guidelines 
2002/C165/03) 
 
 
Publications of the implementation reports 
due early 2006  
Source: This table is based on various EU documents 
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THE EUROPEAN TELECOMS INDUSTRY AND THE FIVE SECTORS 
REGULATED: TERMINALS, SERVICES, SATELLITE, MOBILE AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
TERMINALS 
1988:  Terminal Directive 
1991:  Mutual Recognition Type Approval 
SERVICES  
1990: Services Directives 
1991:  ONP Framework Directive 
1992:  ONP Leased Lines Directive 
1995:  ONP Voice Telephony Directive 
1996:  ONP Interconnection Directive  
1998:  Voice Telephony Liberalization  
SATELLITE 
1991:  Green Paper Satellite 
1993:  Mutual Recognition Satellite Terminal Equipment 
1994:  Satellite Directive  
MOBILE  
1994:  Green Paper Mobile 
1996:  Mobile Radio Liberalization  
1998:  Removal of Service Restrictions  
INFRASTRUCTURE 
1994:  Green Paper Infrastructure Part I  
1995:  Green Paper Infrastructure II 
1996:  Limited Infrastructure Liberalization (CATV)  
1998:  Full Infrastructure Liberalization  
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCE OF NEW INSTITUTIONS, COMMITTEE 
AND ASSOCIATIONS DURING THE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS 
1988: As the result of the Council resolution of 30 June 1988 on the Development of the common 
market for telecommunications up to 1992. 
Creation of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 
Focus on the harmonization of telecommunications standards.http://www.etsi.org/
1994 
ENF: Establishment of a European Numbering Forum. The members are as follow:  
- ETNO (European Public telecommunications Network Operators’ Association) 
- ETSI (The European Telecommunications Standards Institute) 
- EITA (The European Information Industry Association) 
- ECTEL (The European Telecommunications Manufacturers Association) 
- ECMA (The European Computer Manufacturers Association) 
- EIG (The GSM MoU European Interest Group) 
- ECTRA (The European Committee of Telecommunications Regulatory Authorities)  
- The European Commission  
Duty: to prepare opinions, recommendations and reports for both the community and for ECTRA 
(Source: Green paper COM (96) 590, p.5) 
1998: As a result of the 1998 package 
ONP Committee  
Licensing Committee  
2003: As the result of the implementation of the new regulatory Framework (2002)  
The Communication Committee (COCOM) (replaced the ONP Committee and the Licensing 
Committee) 
- Radio Spectrum Committee (RSC) 
- Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG)  
- European Regulator Groups (ERG)  
Duty: protection of individual privacy related to the processing of personal data. 
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